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Criminal Hearsay Rules:
Constitutional Issues
I. INTRODUCTION
The drafters of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence (here-
inafter "Federal Rule[s]" or "federal proposal") and the Proposed
Nebraska Rules of Evidence (hereinafter "Nebraska Rule [s]," .Ne-
braska proposal" or "Rule[s]") assumed that it was not proper to
state rules of constitutional dimensions. Constitutional problems
were left entirely to traditional common law development through
the adversary process. Therefore, the federal and state drafts in
almost all cases relegate discussion of constitutional issues to the
commentary and in some instances the draft does not touch these
problems at all. With the Nebraska proposal, the state constitution
must be considered, but there are very few rules which are per-
ceived as being different because of the Nebraska Constitution.
If the United States Supreme Court adopted or changed a rule
of evidence applicable in state courts, it would be confusing to have
a contrary rule stated in a Nebraska compilation. This would be
true if the change involved a further limitation on admissibility.
On the other hand, if, as seems more likely, the United States Su-
preme Court change involved a lessening of the federal constitu-
tional limitations, the Nebraska committee assumed that Nebraska
would follow that lead. A formal compilation of the rule in Ne-
braska would make that change inapplicable-at least until there
were time for legislative action. The need for a statement of such
rules of constitutional limitations remains of paramount impor-
tance; and their application to different situations and how other
courts treat them is important, but this is best handled through
the various services which are kept current.
This article will refer to some of these constitutional problems,
* A.B. 1930, J.D. 1936 University of Michigan; Professor, University of
Nebraska College of Law.
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but it is not intended as an exhaustive collection even though the
great majority of them do come within the criminal trial area.
II. BASIC PATTERNS
Clearly, any treatment of the theoretical and practical bases for
the proposed rules should make absolutely certain at the start that
there is a necessary interrelation among the rules. All of the rules
are intended to be governed not only by the specific statement
of a particular rule, but also by other rules some of which are
automatically effective and others which give counsel opportunities
for modifying the way the rule operates.
With respect to Article VIII's hearsay rules, the grand pattern,
which must be felt and applied at all times by both counsel and
judge, should include the following other rules:
1. Rule 806-the declarant may be impeached as if he were a wit-
ness, except that there is no requirement of a foundation on
cross for prior inconsistent statements or conduct.
2. Rule 602 - the declarant must have spoken from personal
knowledge-unless the specific hearsay exception otherwise
provides.
3. Rule 403-otherwise admissible evidence (as non-hearsay or
hearsay admissible under an exception) may be excluded "if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by consideration of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
4. Modern Discovery-although criminal discovery is not as broad
as civil, Brady v. Maryland' does give a criminal defendant
the constitutional right to know things that may aid in his de-
fense.
5. The Federal Rules continue the traditional right of the judge
to comment on the weight of the evidence.2 The Nebraska
Rules do not allow a judge to comment on the weight of the
evidence, except for evidence which is limited in its application
by the fact-trier where an instruction to that effect may be re-
quested.3
6. Rule 513(c)-if a claim of privilege is upheld, any party
against whom an adverse inference might be drawn may ask
for an instruction that no inference may be drawn therefrom.
7. Rule 303-the power of the judge to enter a verdict of acquittal
when no reasonable man could find the defendant guilty of one
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Caveat-
1. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
2. This right was deleted by the House Committee on the Judiciary from
PRoP. FED. R. Evm. 105, but without intending to change the rule.
H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973). This subject should
be left for separate consideration at another time.
3. PROP. NEB. R. EviD. 106 [hereinafter cited as RuLE].
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the application of this rule to the defense of insanity is not
stated in the rules, although it is the Nebraska rule.4
Rule 403 requires some additional comment. In the first place,
the words "unfair" and "undue" must be emphasized. After all,
any evidence is intended to be prejudicial to the opposing party
and will take time. Traditional statements of the rule include the
concept of surprise. This concept was deleted from the Federal
Rules because discovery, if effectively used, usually negates any
unfair surprise in civil cases. In criminal cases, this is not so
clear.
Rule 403 has special significance in criminal cases in the hear-
say area. There are as many different kinds of hearsay as there
are plants in the ground; and like plants, some are edible and some
are not. Rule 802 excluding hearsay and Rules 803 and 804 provid-
ing for exceptions are based upon the proposition that the fact-
trier should in the normal case be able to test the accuracy (truth)
of the evidence and the inference which the proponent of the evi-
dence asks the fact-trier to draw. In a criminal case, the "fact-
trier" is customarily the jury. This testing logically depends on
the jury's assessment of the witness's perception, memory, com-
municative ability and sincerity. When the witness is in court,
this testing is an amalgamation of his oath, demeanor and cross-
examination. To these are added the other evidence in the case,
the fact-trier's own common sense and the counsel's arguments.
Many, if not most, of the hearsay declarations involve situations
in which some of these tests cannot be used. The exceptions to
the hearsay rule have developed out of a need for that kind of
evidence and a decision that there is something in the extrajudicial
declaration, in its context and in the context of the trial, that per-
mits one to decide that the jury will not be misled in assessing
its accuracy. Obviously, to generalize a hearsay exception leaves
some things in each that are highly accurate and some that are
highly inaccurate. Rule 403 is designed to permit the latter to be
excluded.
III. SPECIFIC RULES
Article VIII is divided into three major parts. Rule 801 defines
hearsay, but its important provisions are those which state what
is not hearsay. This does not mean that such evidence is always
admissible; much of such evidence will be excluded for other rea-
4. The problem of whether proving other "affirmative defenses" may be
cast on the defendant is discussed in MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13 (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1955).
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sons. Rule 803 states a group of exceptions which apply whether
the declarant is available or not. Rule 804 states a group of ex-
ceptions which apply only when the declarant is unavailable, as
therein defined. Again, the exceptions do not automatically admit,
if some other rule of exclusion applies. Each of these major parts
will be discussed in their application to criminal cases.
A. What is Not Hearsay
1. Operative Facts
It is elementary, and yet often lost sight of in trying to analyze
the various problems in this area, that the acts claimed to be crim-
inal when reported in court by an observer do not involve hearsay.
This is equally true when the act reported involves verbal conduct
of the accused at the time of the alleged crime. 5 Those words may
show either a specific intent necessary to the crime charged or a
lack of such intent.
Theoretical difficulties arise when the acts or words do not coin-
cide with the precise time of the criminal act charged and when
acts or words of somebody other than the accused are offered. Both
of these situations, however, are defined as not hearsay (within
the limits stated) under the admissions doctrine of 801(d) (2). 6 If
the acts or words are those of the defendant on trial, there is no
hearsay. There is of course another group of objections, however,
contained in the common law and the constitutional objections to
confessions.
If the acts or words are those of someone other than defendant
on trial, the rule is ambiguous without reference to the comment.
It adopts the traditional strict standard for admissibility of co-con-
spirators' statements in 801(d) (2) (E)-they must have been made
during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy and are
admissible only when the defendant's connection with the conspir-
acy is established by other evidence. The Federal Rule's comment,
which is also stated in the Nebraska proposal, makes it clear that
there is no intent to extend the vicarious admissions doctrine of
other agents stated in 801(d) (2) (D) for civil cases to the criminal
area. Nor is there any intent to think of a conspiracy as involving
a continuing conspiracy to conceal the original crime-either the
5. State v. Young, 190 Neb. 325, 208 N.W.2d 267 (1973).
6. It is true there has been a long theoretical debate whether admissions
are not hearsay or whether they should be classified among the ex-
ceptions. It is impossible, however, to discern any practical difference
this debate has made in the way the rules operate.
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specific crime or the conspiracy to commit it. 7 The concealment
or cover-up, however, may be thought of and charged as a differ-
ent crime, such as obstructing justice.
The comment is not clear on whether a statement by an agent
specifically authorized to deal on behalf of the accused should be
defined as not hearsay. In the normal situation of an attorney
working toward a plea bargain, such statements would be inadmis-
sible under Rule 410.8 The concept of an adopted admission during
the commission of crime was used in United States V. Lemonakis9
A recorded telephone conversation between defendant and X was
admitted without calling X. The jury was instructed that the only
statements of X it could consider were those the defendant adopted
by his part of the conversation.1 0
A somewhat different kind of statement is what Wigmore clas-
sified as "a verbal act"--that is, one which is not offered to prove
the truth of the fact asserted. This involves a statement which
is relevant to the crime charged solely because it was made to
someone and that hearer's knowledge (whether accurate or not)
is significant. It may be offered by the prosecution, for example,
to show knowledge by the driver of a car that the car was stolen
or that someone in the car possessed contraband. Or it may be
offered by the defense to show the reasonableness of defendant's
self-defense claim, as a threat made by the victim.
2. Non-assertive conduct
The traditional development of the non-assertive conduct prob-
lem stems from Wright v. Doe ex dem Tatham.1 Issues in this area
7. See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); Krulewitch v. United
States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949). It should be pointed out that a conspir-
acy does not have to be charged as a separate crime in order for
this exception to be applied. See United States v. Alsondo, 486 F.2d
1339 (2d Cir. 1973); C. McCoRiCK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF Evi-
DENCE 646 (2d ed. 1972).
8. The problem is further complicated by RuLE 804(b) (4) 's concern
with declarations against penal interest.
9. 485 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
10. The problem of admitting an authorized admission in civil cases is
often met with respect to pleadings. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-824 (Cum.
Supp. 1972) specifically states that authorized admissions cannot be
used in any criminal action "as proof of a fact admitted or alleged
in such pleading." Presumably, they could be used to impeach al-
though there appears to be no Nebraska authority. If so, the statute
would override Ruis 801 (d) and the impeaching statement could not
be used substantively. The problem is interwoven with the rules
concerning self-incrimination.
11. 7 Eng. Rep. 559 (H.L. 1838).
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have had many applications in criminal cases and the admissibility
arguments will go on forever. If non-verbal conduct is intended
to be assertive of a fact-pointing to X in a line-up, shaking a
head up and down or sideways, waving a flag, shaking a fist-
then it is hearsay. It is excluded under Rule 802 unless it is ad-
mitted under an 803 or 804 exception or unless it is an admission
under 801(d).
A serious and perhaps unresolved problem arises when the con-
duct is ambiguous. It may or may not have been intended as an
assertion of the fact for which it is offered, and the fact for which
it is offered may or may not be a valid basis for the inference
that is sought to be drawn. The comments treat this as a basic
problem in judicial determination of a preliminary fact.12
There have been some interesting, recent cases involving the
often recurring situation of a person being questioned at or near
the scene of a crime. Traditional law permitted the prosecution
to show that this person remained silent or equivocated in the face
of an accusation of a crime, although Nebraska and a number of
other jurisdictions required a strong showing that the context of
the police-suspect encounter demanded a finding that a reasonable
man would not have remained silent.' 3 Miranda v. Arizona,'4 how-
12. When evidence of conduct is offered on the theory that it is
not a statement, and hence not hearsay, a preliminary deter-
mination will be required to determine whether an assertion
is intended. The rule is so worded as to place the burden
upon the party claiming that the intention existed; ambigu-
ous and doubtful cases will be resolved against him and in
favor of admissibility. The determination involves no greater
difficulty than many other preliminary questions of fact.
PRop. FED. R. EviD. 801, Advisory Committee's Note. Presumably, this
preliminary fact determination is for the judge to make under RULE
104(a).
13. See Pierce v. State, 173 Neb. 319, 113 N.W.2d 333 (1962):
[T]he effect of the ruling is to admit the officer's testimony
on the theory that the silence of the defendant, or, more
properly, his failure to give a reason when none was re-
quested, was an admission of guilt, or, at the very least, a
circumstance indicating guilt. There is no question it would
be so considered by the jury. This appears to be carrying
the doctrine of silence a step too far. To require a defendant
to anticipate the nature of an accusation and to require him
to give reasons without inquiry is to make a farce of the pre-
sumption of innocence. Nebraska has gone further than
many jurisdictions on the criteria of silence as an admission,
but it is still the rule in Nebraska that in the absence of a
duty to speak, silence is not an admission.
Id. at 325-26, 113 N.W.2d at 339. State v. Watson, 182 Neb. 692, 157
N.W.2d 156 (1968), appears to be much less strict, but the holding
was also based on the statement being part of the res gestae and the
silence argument was apparently not briefed.
14. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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ever, specifically held that this was within that rule of exclusion,
absent warnings. The cases seek to limit Miranda by requiring
some specific accusation or at least a focusing of the investigation,
and if that is not involved, the old conflict of authority as to silence
apparently still exists. In People v. Bobo,15 defendant was stopped
by a policeman after a robbery and questioned, but not arrested.
The defendant was later charged, and he testified in his own de-
fense that he had seen two other men run past him. On cross,
it was brought out that he had said nothing about seeing other
men to the policeman who originally questioned him, and the prose-
cutor stressed this in his closing. The Michigan Supreme Court
in a 4-3 decision, relying on prior Michigan case law and the trial
of Jesus as reported by Matthew, held it was error to bring out
that the defendant originally said nothing about seeing other men.
In United States ex rel. Burt v. New Jersey,' however, the court
held it was proper for the state, after defendant had testified to
self-defense in a murder case, to bring out that he had been ar-
rested for a different crime, and he had then made no mention
of having shot the deceased. The court, relying on Harris v. New
York,17 thought the relevance and inconsistency was clear.""
3. Prior Statements by Witness
The Nebraska Rules in 801(d) (1) set out two kinds of prior
statements by a declarant who testifies at trial and is subject to
cross-examination which are not hearsay:
(A) a prior inconsistent statement
(B) a prior consistent statement offered to rebut an express or
implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper
influence or motive.
These two types of prior statements are merely a codification of
traditional law so far as admissibility to impeach or support is con-
cerned, and the usual foundation requirement is found in Rule
613(b). The Federal Rules define as not hearsay a third type of
prior statement-one of identification of a person made soon after
perceiving him. The first two parts of the proposed Federal Rule
801(d)(1) originally were the same as the Nebraska rule. The
House Committee on the Judiciary amended the Federal Rule so
that only prior inconsistent statements made while the declarant
was subject to cross-examination at a trial, hearing or deposition
15. 390 Mich. 355, 212 N.W.2d 190 (1973).
16. 475 F.2d 234 (3d Cir. 1973). Three different judges of the same cir-
cuit again discussed the problem, reaching conflicting decisions as to
pure silence-at least after Miranda warnings. Agnellino v. New
Jersey, 493 F.2d 714 (3d Cir. 1974).
17. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
18. Certiorari was denied with three dissents. 94 S. Ct. 243 (1973).
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are not hearsay and are admissible substantively and the House
passed the proposal in that form.19
The only difference from present law and Nebraska's proposed
801 (d) (1) is that such statements, if admitted, are no longer lim-
ited to their impeaching effect.2 0 The essential idea that the im-
peachment limitation was never of much real effect on the jury
is undoubtedly true, and the proposed rules merely follow the lead
of various states in removing the limitation. The use of such state-
ments substantively, however, in some states has not been free of
problems.
The constitutionality of those state rules allowing the use of
prior statements substantively was upheld in California v. Green.2 1
Although the justices split as to any distinction between the 14th
amendment due process and 6th amendment confrontation con-
cepts, the adoption of the Federal Rules by all of the justices ex-
cept Douglas suggests that at least where there is an opportunity
at the trial for cross-examination with respect to the prior state-
ment, no confrontation difficulties are seen.
This article's analysis has been relatively straight-forward in fol-
lowing the order of presentation of the proposed rules. But there
are several other rules concerned with hearsay exceptions which
may or may not be a "prior statement of a witness." This raises
a number of essential conflicts in theory and in practice, some of
which have been considered by the courts and others which -are
only now appearing. As a matter of fact, most of the Rules 803
and 804 exceptions can be a prior statement of a witness.
22
What has been discussed so far are prior statements which do
not come under any other exception. If they are inconsistent with
the witness's present testimony, they may be offered by either
prosecution or defense and the proponent or the opponent of the
witness. However, if prior statements are offered by the prosecu-
tion as to its own witness, it must be shown that there is no vio-
lation of the due process concepts of Douglas v. Alabama23 and
19. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1973); 120 CoNG. REC.
H559-70 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974).
20. It should be noted that the House Committee modification discussed
in note 19 supra did not provide that prior statements not made while
subject to cross could not be used, but only that they cannot be used
substantively. Prior inconsistent statements not made at a trial, hear-
ing or deposition can still be used for impeachment purposes under
the federal proposal.
21. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
22. Even a dying declaration under RuLE 804(b) (3) could be a prior
statement of a witness.
23. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
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Napue v. Illinois2 4 --i.e. what Harlan called "prosecutorial miscon-
duct" in Dutton v. Evans. 25 Moreover, the witness must be "sub-
ject to cross-examination concerning the [prior] statement," and the
statements must be inconsistent with present testimony. More
specifically, if the witness takes the position that he has no pres-
ent memory or refuses to testify about the prior statement, it
should seem clear that one or the other or both of those prerequi-
sites has not been met.
Under the proposed rules, if the prior statement is inconsistent
with his present testimony, but the witness refuses to talk about
the prior statement, it can presumably still be used for impeach-
ment though not substantively. There is a line that must be drawn
in these cases between an honest effort by the prosecution to get
the witness to refresh his memory and a flat device simply to put
the prior statement before the jury in a backhanded way.2 6 The
proposed rules suggest that this should be done in such a way as
to avoid the Douglas error, as by holding hearings outside the pres-
ence of the jury.2 7 Certainly, the prosecution should not be arti-
ficially deprived of the right to put as much pressure on the wit-
ness to testify truthfully as is fair and reasonable. 28
24. 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
25. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
26. United States v. Miles, 413 F.2d 34 (3d Cir. 1969).
27. See RULE 103 (c).
28. The strongest recent statement in favor of letting the prosecution put
fair and reasonable pressure on the witness to testify truthfully was
by Judge Friendly in United States v. Burket, 480 F.2d 568 (2d Cir.
1973).
The defense's first claim with respect to the examination
of Mrs. Bortz and Mrs. Davis is that the government called
them although knowing that they would refuse to testify on
the ground of self-incrimination. Such action has been held
to be error, although not necessarily calling for reversal, ei-
ther on the theory that the government is guilty of prosecu-
torial misconduct by seeking to build its case out of an infer-
ence from invocation of the privilege or on the view that the
defendant is unfairly prejudiced by inability to cross-exam-
ine. The short answer to all this in the instant case is that,
having learned that the two ladies would refuse to testify un-
less granted immunity, the prosecutor obtained this and was
then advised by their attorneys that they would testify, al-
though not as the prosecutor might anticipate from state-
ments they had given to agents of the FBI shortly after the
robbery. This did not make it improper for the prosecutor
to call them, see what they would actually do under the
sanctity of the oath, and, if necessary, confront them with
their previous statements to refresh their memory or, if that
failed, to impeach them. Such error as there may have been
lay in the prosecutor's endeavor to short-cut "the judicially
sanctioned ritual" of first endeavoring to refresh the ladies'
recollection of each matter with the relevant passage of their
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Other devicies to force the witness to talk are also available
such as contempt, immunity and plea bargaining. Where the prose-
cution is trying to force its own witness to talk, these are all of
questionable desirability since they open the witness to the threat
of impeachment. And yet, if the defense does impeach by a prior
inconsistent statement, the prior consistent statement could come
in substantively under 801 (d) (1) (B) if the defendant takes the po-
sition that the trial testimony is the result of recent fabrication,
improper influence or motive, and also assuming the witness will
talk about the prior statement on cross by defense. If there were
no such claim, the prior statements might be admissible under the
doctrine of completeness 29 if they were in some way related.
The problems of the defense offering a prior inconsistent state-
ment of a witness for the prosecution, or of his own witness, or
offering a consistent prior statement essentially would be the same
except that professional misconduct by defense counsel presumably
would not involve due process.
A consideration of prior statements of a trial witness which are
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, other than by Rule
801(d), involves different problems. Disregarding constitutional
problems, it is probably fair to say that prior statements always
will be admitted if inconsistent with present testimony and they
will be admitted substantively. This is the general rule. If the
prior statement is consistent, there is a problem of cumulative evi-
dence and it may be excluded under Rule 403. The traditional
rule against supporting one's own witness who has not been im-
preached sometimes will be stated, but one is never certain that
statements to the FBI agents, then asking whether they had
said what was reported and, if this was denied, calling the
agents to complete the impeachment. Instead, his method of
interrogation in effect placed the statements directly before
the jury. But any mistake was fully cured by the judge's
speedy and strong instructions that the jury was not to con-
sider the statements to the FBI agents for any purpose other
than as affecting the witnesses' credibility and specifically
not as evidence of the defendants' guilt.
Id. at 571-72. Unfortunately, it is impossible to judge whether in
Burket there was anything unfair without a consideration of what the
defense counsel was able to do on the cross-examination. None of
this is suggested in the opinion. It is interesting to note that when
Judge Friendly handled a similar problem in a dissent just four
months later, he considered at length the relative effectiveness of the
cross-examination and the redirect as well as what he obviously con-
sidered prosecutorial misconduct and a failure of the judge to read
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), correctly. United States
ex rel. Cannon v. Montanye, 486 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1973).
29. See RuLE 107.
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the court really intended to lay down such a rule.80
Constitutonal problems, however, are definitely involved; they
will be treated in connection with the hearsay exceptions.
B. Hearsay Exceptions
This portion of the article will discuss various exceptions in pro-
posed Rules 803 and 804, primarily focusing on their application
when the declarant is not then testifying.
Rules 803(22), judgement of previous conviction, and 804(b) (4),
statement against interest, 'are the only rules which specifically
state a distinction between civil and criminal cases. A judgment
of conviction of a felony is not admissible when offered by the
government (except for impeachment). This applies only to con-
victions of persons other than the accused when offered by the
government. The conviction of an accused may be res judicata
if the fact of guilt is an element of the crime now being tried,
although it may run afoul of double jeopardy. A declaration
against interest exposing the declarant to criminal liability and of-
fered by the defendant must be corroborated.
1. Constitutional Considerations
All of the exceptions, however, are open to the constitutional
objections outlined in Green and Dutton and some of these objec-
tions are specifically dealt with by the rules. Prior testimony, 804
(b) (1), is covered in Pointer v. Texas31 and Barber v. Page32 and
statements against interest in Roberts v. Russel33 (applying Bruton
v. United States34 to the states) as modified in Nelson v. O'NeiI35
and perhaps other cases.
Green and Dutton both were concerned with state rules admit-
ting hearsay evidence which was attacked as violating 6th amend-
ment confrontation rights. Both cases found no constitutional vio-
lation in the particular situations presented. They held at least
that constitutional confrontation does not exclude all hearsay. In
Green the Court held that certain prior inconsistent statements of
a trial witness given at a preliminary hearing could be used sub-
stantively and in Dutton the Court held that a particular extra-
30. See, e.g., Mitchell v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 430 F.
2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1970).
31. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
32. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
33. 392 U.S. 293 (1968).
34. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
35. 402 U.S. 622 (1971).
436 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 53, NO. 3 (1974)
judicial statement of a co-conspirator could be used even though
it was not made "durng the course and in furtherance of the con-
piracy."
2. Former Testimony
In Pointer the Court held a statement of a declarant at a pre-
liminary hearing, not present at trial, could not be introduced at
trial where there had been no opportunity for meaningful cross-
examination at the time of the hearing. Mancusi v. Stubbs36
held statements at a prior trial admissible where there had been
opportunity for cross and the declarant was proved unavailable at
trial. Barber held, however, that the state had to make all rea-
sonable efforts to produce the declarant at trial. These cases, of
course, put specific limitations on the application of Rule 804 (b) (1)
in criminal cases. It seems that as the law stands today, testimony
by witnesses in a prior trial of the same crime and the same de-
fendant would be admissible if that declarant is in fact unavail-
able.
If the statement were given at a prior trial of some person
other than the present accused, the Nebraska Rule, as did the rule
proposed by the Supreme Court, lets these statements in substan-
tively in both civil and criminal cases when it was given at the
prior trial "against a party with an opportunity to develop the tes-
timony by direct, cross, or redirect examination, with motive and
interest similar to those of the party against whom now offered. '37
The federal rule as passed by the House of Representatives goes
back to the traditional rule requiring identity of parties in crim-
inal cases and a requirement of privity in civil cases.38 The orig-
inal federal comment admitted that it had no case or rule or statu-
tory support, but relied on Professor Falknor's argument that ad-
mitting such statements was at least as trustworthy as dying dec-
larations and usually more so since there was once a meaningful
36. 408 U.S. 204 (1972).
37. RuLE 804(b) (1).
38. Former testimony.-Testimony given as a witness at another
hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposi-
tion taken in compliance with law in the course of the same
or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testi-
mony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a
predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar mo-
tive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect ex-
amination.
PROP. FED. R. EvD. 804(b) (1), passed by House, 120 CONG. REc. H560,
H570 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974). See H.R. Rm,. No. 93-650, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 15 (1973) for committee amendments of rule. The change
in civil cases is certainly a major step backward,
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opportunity to cross.39 The comment also noted that the issue was
left open in Mattox v. United States,40 which is true; but the case's
dictum against admissibility is strong.41
The language in Mancusi arguably supports Falknor's opinion
since the standard used by the majority generalizes the specific
prior testimony exception requiring that the hearsay exception
"bore sufficient 'indicia of reliability' and afforded 'the trier of fact
a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior state-
ment'. ' 42 The inner quotes are from Dutton. It appears that a
showing of an adequate cross-examination in the prior trial of the
now absent declarant on the issues now relevant against the defend-
ant is required. This requirement was specifically argued in Man-
cusi and the Court stated that there had been such a showing. In
short, it is seriously doubtful that the Court will uphold the ad-
mission of prior testimony given at the trial of a different person.
The admissibility of prior testimony if the "unavailability" at
trial involves a simple refusal to testify not supported by a valid
claim of the privilege against self-incrimination or a lack of mem-
ory about the prior statement also can be assumed. Justice White's
opinion in Green can be read to hold that meaningful cross either
at the time the declaration was made or at the trial is enough.
The practical situation at the particular trial, however, clearly
must demonstrate that the witness's refusal to testify at trial is
not in any way connived in by the prosecutor. The practical sit-
uation must also demonstrate that the prior opportunity to cross-
examine was meaningful.
The other side of the coin is equally disturbing. Where the
witness at trial recants, refuses to testify or simply claims a lack
39. Falknor, Former Testimony and the Uniform Rules: A Comment, 38
N.Y.U.L. REv. 651, 655 (1963).
40. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
41. The substance of the constitutional protection is preserved to
the prisoner in the advantage he has once had of seeing the
witness face to face, and of subjecting him to the ordeal of a
cross-examination. This, the law says, he shall under no cir-
cumstances be deprived of, and many of the very cases which
hold testimony such as this to be admissible also hold that
not the substance of his testimony only, but the very words
of the witness, shall be proven. We do not wish to be under-
stood as expressing an opinion upon this point, but all the
authorities hold that a copy of the stenographic report of his
entire former testimony, supported by the oath of the stenog-
rapher that it is a correct transcript of his notes and of the
testimony of the deceased witness, such as was produced in
this case, is competent evidence of what he said.
Id. at 244.
42. 408 U.S. at 216.
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of memory, it may be because of pressure by defendant or by in-
terests he represents. Here the state should be permitted to intro-
duce the prior preliminary hearing testimony. But the judge
should require a fair showing by the prosecution that such pres-
sure exists.43
An analogous problem concerns depositions which usually have
not been subsumed under the hearsay rubric. Although the Ne-
braska statutes provide for depositions by the state in criminal
cases, they may be used only at trial to impeach 44 and where the
witness is available at trial for cross. This would appear to be
acceptable under any reading of Green and other cases. Federal
law does permit such depositions to be used substantively where
the witness is unavailable. 45 The constitutionality of the federal
law was upheld in a 3-2 decision of the second circuit in United
States v. Singleton.46 The dissent in Singleton contended that con-
frontation in the constitutional sense involved not only cross-ex-
amination but also the right of the jury to see and judge the de-
meanor of the declarant. Perhaps, this might be alleviated if the
deposition were videotaped, but not wholly since the trial environ-
ment and the jury's presence are also significant.47
3. Declarations Against Interest
Similar problems arise with declarations against interest under
804(b) (4). The Nebraska Rule makes admissible a declaration
against penal interest where the declarant is unavailable. In its
1971 form and as now modified by the House, the Federal Rule spe-
cifically excludes from this exception a statement or confession of
someone other than the accused implicating both himself and the
accused. That exclusion from the rule was derived from the pre-
viously discussed holding in Krulewitch that a co-conspirator's con-
fession must be in the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy
-with which Nebraska decisions agree. The exclusion also is
based on the Bruton and Roberts holdings that where two defend-
ants are tried together, defendant A's confession, which is admis-
sible against A, cannot be introduced in either a federal or state
trial if it implicates defendant B, even with a Imiting instruction.
Although Krulewitch was not constitutionally based, both Bruton
43. See, e.g., United States v. West, 486 F.2d 468 (6th Cir. 1973).
44. NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-1917 (4) (Cum. Supp. 1972).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 3503 (f) (Supp. 1973); FED. R. Calm. P. 15.
46. 460 F.2d 1148, cert. denied, 410 U.S. 984 (1972). See also 19 N.Y.L.
FORUM 198 (1973).
47. See Hutchins v. State, 286 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1973), where a videotape
deposition was held admissible.
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and Roberts were specifically grounded on the confrontation clause
and made applicable to the states under the 14th amendment and
Pointer. The exclusion would be clear, whether stated in the pro-
posed rule or not, except for the fact that the plurality opinion
in Dutton said Bruton was not applicable except where the defend-
ants were tried together. This was somewhat modified in Mancusi
where the Court said that the Dutton case was to be strictly lim-
ited to the facts of that case, presumably where the dangers of
non-confrontation are relatively small.
In Nelson the United States Supreme Court further modified
Bruton and Russell in holding that where two defendants are tried
together and make a common defense, A's confession implicating
B may be introduced against A if A takes the stand and is thus
available for cross-examination by B. The fact that A denied mak-
ing the prior confession and therefore B found it silly to cross-
examine him, made it only that much less a violation of B's con-
frontation rights. The Nebraska Rule 804(b) (4) should be modi-
fied to conform to the present House version.
It also must be remembered that confessions of co-conspirators
are subject to the requirement that they were made voluntarily.
Whether Jackson v. Denno4s and Sims v. Goergia49 require a prior
specific judge and record finding of voluntariness is not clear from
the cases, although the latest decision, whiclh collects the bulk
of the law in the area, so held.50
It is assumed, however, that Nelson cannot affect Rule 804
(b) (4) since the rule requires the declarant to be unavailable. Fur-
thermore, it should be remembered that 804(b) (4) may be used
to admit the prior declaration against penal interest of a now un-
available declarant which exculpates defendant, provided it is cor-
roborated. 51 But if the defendant offers such a statement, the
state can offer to impeach by offering any prior inconsistent state-
ment, that is one inculpating defendant, under Rule 806.
4. Business Records
This article has not discussed the almost wholly undefined area
of the application of other hearsay exceptions under confrontation
48. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
49. 385 U.S. 538 (1967).
50. LaFrance v. Bohlinger, 365 F. Supp. 198 (D. Mass. 1973).
51. See also United States v. Roberts, 483 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1973), where
the court held that admission into evidence of a codefendant's extra-judicial confession which appears to exculpate defendant can't pos-
sibly prejudice the defendant.
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concepts.5 2 In United States v. Williams53 the court held it was
not a confrontation denial for an expert on valuation to rely on
reports and business records so long as the expert was open to
cross-examination as to the bases for his opinions. The court had
no doubt that admitting the report, without the testimony of the
man who made it, would have been a violation.
The fifth circuit followed the Williams holding in an almost
identical situation in United States v. Musgrave54 and in two cases
involving medical experts. 55 In United States v. Knox 56 the fifth
circuit, again relying on Williams, held there was no confrontation
violation when an expert relied on business records of oil produc-
tion. In United States v. Thompkins5 7 the eighth circuit, concerned
with a report to a federal agency, stated that the informant should
have been called for cross-examination. The holding, however, was
that the failure to call the informant was not prejudicial since the
report had been made by a different person (wife) who was a wit-
ness.
58
5. Public Records
The ninth circuit considered proof of non-registration of a fire-
arm by the certificate of the keeper of the records that none ex-
isted in Warren v. United States.59 The court admitted the cer-
tificate and found no confrontation violation, relying on prior busi-
ness record and public record cases as well as Wigmore. The court
did not mention recent Supreme Court cases casting substantial
doubt on Wigmore's broad view that no hearsay exception violated
the confrontation clause. The issue focused on in Warren is cov-
ered by Rule 803(10) which admits a certificate by an authorized
person stating that a diligent search failed to disclose a public rec-
ord or entry.60
52. Except dying declarations under RULE 804(b) (3).
53. 447 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1971).
54. 483 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1973).
55. United States v. Davila-Nater, 474 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Harper, 460 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1972). See also United States
v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971).
56. 458 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1972).
57. 487 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1973).
58. In United States v. Blake, 488 F.2d 101 (1973), the fifth circuit ex-
cluded business records which were not proved by anyone familiar
with their actual compilation. The business records exception is also
rampant in anti-trust suits and tax fraud cases although many of
these can rely on the non-hearsay statement of the opposing party
exception as extended by the statements of authorized agents.
59. 447 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1971).
60. See also FED. R. C~ai. P. 27.
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The public records exception of Rule 803(8) involves at least
two hearsay declarations: the certificate that the record says thus
and so, and the report in the record. Probably, no one would be
bothered about the first type of declaration. The second declara-
tion is more doubtful, and this exception may cause constitutional
problems unless the "facts required to be observed and recorded
pursuant to a duty imposed by law"'6 1 can be shown to have been
done so in a significantly trustworthy way, and there is good rea-
son not to require the declarant's presence at trial. Rule 901's au-
thentication provisions permit the entry to be shown by the certif-
icate of the person in charge of the records, but, unlike the busi-
ness entries exception, Rule 803(8) puts the burden of proving un-
trustworthiness on the opponent. The rule does require that the
proponent give reasonable notice to the opposing party prior to
trial.62 The proof of untrustworthiness may become exceedingly
61. RULE 803(8).
62. The notice requirement is illustrated by the following Iowa statutes
setting up a criminalistics laboratory:
It shall be presumed that any employee or technician of
the criminalistics laboratory is qualified or possesses the re-
quired expertise to accomplish any analysis, comparison, or
identification done by him in the course of his employment
in the criminalistics laboratory. Any report, or copy thereof,
or the findings of the criminalistics laboratory shall be re-
ceived in evidence in any court, preliminary hearing, and
grand jury proceeding in the same manner and with the same
force and effect as if the employee or technician of the crim-
inalistics laboratory who accomplished the requested analy-
sis, comparison, or identification had testified in person. An
accused person or his attorney may request that such em-
ployee or technician testify in person at a criminal trial on
behalf of the state before a jury or to the court, by notifying
the proper county attorney at least ten days before the date
of such criminal trial.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 794 A.2 (Supp. 1973).
The county attorney shall give the accused person, or his
attorney, after an indictment or county attorney's information
has been returned, a copy of each report of the findings of
the criminalistics laboratory conducted in the investigation of
the indictable criminal charge against him at the time of ar-
raignment, or if such report is received after arraignment,
upon receipt, whether or not such findings are to be used in
evidence against him. If such report is not given to the ac-
cused or his attorney at least four days prior to trial, such
fact shall be grounds for continuance.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 749A.4 (Supp. 1973). This Iowa statute is similar
to Nebraska's Uniform Composite Reports as Evidence Act, NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-12,115 et seq. (Reissue 1964). In both the Nebraska and
Iowa statutes, the result of an investigation is made known to the
defendant, and the report is made admissible, while defendant has
the right to require that the proponent produce any particular mem-
ber of the investigation team for cross. A somewhat similar notice
provision is found in NEW JEnsEy R. Evm, 64.
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difficult if the record is in a computer.63
6. Past Recollection Recorded
Justice Harlan in Dutton referred to business records acts, offi-
cial statements, learned treatises and trade reports as possible ex-
amples of hearsay exceptions which might not violate confronta-
tion. He used these in connection with his balancing theory where
production of declarants would be unduly inconvenient and of
small utility to a defendant. One approach is to carry the require-
ment of producing the first hand knowledge declarant as far back
as is reasonably possible; but at some point in the business records
and public records area, there is a declarant-or an entrant-who
must rely on the past recollection recorded rule. This declarant
has no present recollection, though he may be cross-examined on
the basis for his testimony that he now knows that the entry was
accurate when made. Or, the declarant may be cross-examined
on the custom of accurately proceeding or testing and recording.
If the defendant still can demonstrate a questionable accuracy, his
confrontation objection, as well as a possible hearsay objection,
should be upheld.
The Nebraska Supreme Court specifically applied confrontation
requirements to the proof of a transcribed copy of an oral confes-
sion in State v. Harding.64 In order to be admissible, the court
said that the transcriber must be present and available for cross-
examinaton. Since in this case, the secretary who had transcribed
the confession had died before trial, the confrontation requirements
could not be fulfilled, and the written document was not admis-
sible even though its accuracy was affirmed by other witnesses.
7. Other Exceptions
Rule 803 (2)'s excited utterance exception has been used in a
number of criminal cases.65  The only excited utterance case specif-
ically considering the confrontation problem seems to be Common-
wealth v. McLaughlin66 where it is stated that the sixth amend-
ment would not exclude.
63. It should be noted that the Nebraska rules are not as broad in ad-
mitting reports of investigations as the Federal Rules, although the
Federal Rules exclude such reports in criminal cases.
64. State v. Harding, 184 Neb. 159, 165 N.W.2d 723 (1969). A number
of past recollection recorded cases are collected in United States v.
Davis, 487 F.2d 112, 123 (5th Cir. 1973).
65. See State v. Watson, 182 Neb. 692, 157 N.W.2d 156 (1968); Denison
v. State, 117 Neb. 601, 221 N.W. 683 (1928); 6 J. WiGmoRE, EVIENCE
§ 1750 (1940).
66. -Mass. -, 303 N.E.2d 338 (1973).
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In the great majority of excited utterance cases, the declarant
also testifies at the trial and is therefore available for cross-exami-
nation, 67 but availability for cross-examination is not stated as a
requirement. Justice Harlan's original position in Green, however,
was that any available declarant must be produced by the govern-
ment at trial, and Barber makes an honest effort to make produc-
tion of the declarant a due process requirement before admitting
prior testimony. Harlan withdrew from this general proposition
in Dutton, but it is not inconceivable that other judges would re-
quire the prosecution to make the declarant available for cross-
examination as a matter of due process fairness where there is no
prior opportunity to cross-examine. Such a requirement may be
understandable because the principle difficulty with this exception
is that the very fact of excitement significantly reduces the per-
ception's validity and the defendant should have the right to bring
this out on cross without being forced to call the delcarant as his
own witness.
The same due process requirement may exist for Rule 803(3)'s
statements of then existing mental, emotional or physical condition.
Although the original inability to perceive correctly may not be
as apparent, the motive to misrepresent may be even more con-
cealed and not open to argument to the jury without exploration
by cross-examination. Rape cases and narcotic cases may involve
highly disputed issues of the defendant's identity where the main
evidence offered is a declaration of an alleged victim or receiver
that she or he intended to meet defendant. This need to explore
motives is the basis for the standard statement that the informer's
privilege does not apply if the informer "may be able to give testi-
mony necessary to a fair determination of the issue of guilt or
innocence."48
The pedigree exceptions of Rule 804(b) (5) most often are seen
in criminal cases involving incest, bigamy or adultery. Again, a
court probably would require the government to produce the de-
clarant if he were available. These exceptions involve both oral
and written hearsay and often a combination, but unlike the use
of the pedigree exceptions in the normal run of civil cases, there
is usually some available, living person with the requisite personal
knowledge. There also is available in most cases public entries
which might come in under 803 (8), (9) and (10) exceptions if the
proper foundation is laid.
The dying declaration exception, Rule 804(b) (3), remains the
67. See, e.g., State v. Juarez, 187 Neb. 354, 190 N.W.2d 858 (1971).
68. RuLF 510(c) (2).
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same as always in Nebraska, except it applies in any criminal or
civil case. This exception was one of the first to be held not in vio-
lation of the confrontation clause.69 Nor has this been challenged in
any of the recent cases.
The above exceptions of Rules 803 (2) and (3) and 804(b) (3)
and (5) have been considered from the point of view of evidence
offered by the government. There would seem to be no objection
if the evidence were offered by the defendant.
Rule 803(22)'s exception for judgments of previous felony con-
victions proposes new law, but where offered by the government,
its application in criminal cases is restricted to prior convictions
of the present defendant where the relevance is controlled by the
rules of res judicata or collateral estoppel and double jeopardy.
Similarly, the defendant may offer a prior acquittal of himself, if
relevant under those concepts, but not under this rule.70 Such an
offer by the defendant would come in under the public records
exception.
The 803(22) exception does permit a judgment of felony convic-
tion of another person to be offered by the defendant to prove
any fact essential to sustain that other person's judgment. The
cases upon which this proposed exception is based involved civil
actions, and it is therefore necessary to conjecture how such an
offer might arise in a criminal case. The obvious example of the
conviction of a different person for the same crime will arise very
seldom. The exception does provide a possible method to prove
the violent character of the victim of the defendant's crime where
the defendant uses self-defense. Furthermore, where the lack of
chastity of a prosecutrix in a rape case is a defense, the prosecutrix's
prior conviction of a sex crime would be admissible.
It should be emphasized again that these exceptions are subject
to the judge's right to exclude any evidence that is unfairly pre-
judicial or misleading.' The likelihood of unfair prejudice most
usually is seen in cases where the evidence may have a dual rele-
vance, one admissible and one inadmissible. The usual rule in such
cases is to admit the evidence with an instruction, immediately if
requested, not to consider the evidence for the inadmissible pur-
pose.7 2
69. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
70. A discussion of these rules would unduly lengthen this article. See
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970); Schaefer, Unresolved Issues
in the Law of Double Jeopardy: Walter and Ashe, 58 CALIF. L. Rzv.
391 (1970).
71. RULE 403.
72. RuL 106.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Nebraska Supreme Court case of State v. Howard73 and
the federal habeas corpus appeal of Howard v. Sigler7 4 cut across
the entire area of the use of hearsay in criminal cases. The issue
in these cases was the unavailability of a witness at the first trial
of Howard, thereby laying the foundation for the use of the prior
testimony of that witness at Howard's second trial. The unavail-
ability was proved by an affidavit of a medical officer at the Public
Health Service Indian Hospital in Rapid City, South Dakota. The
affidavit stated that the witness was afflicted with contagious tu-
berculosis, her condition would be greatly impaired by traveling
to Alliance, Nebraska, for the second trial and her disease was in-
fectious. It was admitted that this affidavit was hearsay and ap-
arently it was not argued that the affidavit might come under an
exception. The Nebraska court held that it was within the discre-
tion of the second trial court to admit the affidavit as proof of
unavailability. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, which was presented the issue on appeal from a lower fed-
eral court decision granting Howard habeas corpus relief,7 5 held
that the use of the affidavit did not violate either due process or
confrontation limitations under Barber or Dutton. Although Man-
cusi had not yet been decided, the eighth circuit opinion's language
forecast Mancusi's position that hearsay which bears sufficient in-
dicia of reliability may not violate the confrontation rule.7 6 The
circuit court stated: "The fact of trustworthiness of such affidavit
can be readily acknowledged in most cases and in those cases where
doubt exists further inquiry could be made. '77
The admissibility problem takes on additional significance in
Nebraska because the Nebraska proposal deletes the last sentence
of Federal Rule 104(a) :78 "In making his (judge) determination
73. 184 Neb. 461, 168 N.W.2d 370 (1969).
74. 454 F.2d 115 (8th Cir. 1972).
75. Howard v. Sigler, 325 F. Supp. 272 (D. Neb. 1971) (Urbom, J.).
76. The unavailability of the witness in Mancusi was proved by the testi-
mony of a witness with personal knowledge.
77. 454 F.2d at 121 (emphasis added). The Howard case was followed
by a Minnesota case which admitted an affidavit of defendant's prior
wife that there had been no divorce, thus preventing the person de-
fendant claimed to be his present wife from being disqualified to tes-
tify against him. State v. Martin, 293 Minn. 116, 197 N.W.2d 219
(1972).
78. PROP. FED. R. EviD. 104(a):
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a
person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the
admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the judge.
•... In making his determination he is not bound by the
rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.
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he is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect
to privileges. '79 The comment to Nebraska's Rule 104 (a), however,
suggests that the deletion of the above quoted sentence was not
intended to limit the trial judge in the evidence he might use, but
rather to discourage the judge from an overly lax approach to the
basis for his finding on preliminary facts in either civil or criminal
cases.
79. Similarly, PRoP. FED. R. Evw. 1101(d) (1) is not proposed in Nebraska.
See United States v. Matlock, 94 S. Ct. 988, 994 (1974), holding that
the same rules of evidence governing criminal jury trials do not gov-
ern hearings before a judge to determine evidentiary questions.
